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NOTES
THE POLITICAL BOYCOTT: AN
UNPRIVILEGED FORM OF EXPRESSION
Imagine that the Ku Klux Klan in a small southern town has
organized a boycott to encourage merchants to join in pressuring the
local government to abandon its plan to more fully integrate the work
force. The boycott victims are black-owned businesses. Or posit a
Nazi boycott of Jewish merchants designed to force those merchants to
vote against a Jewish candidate. This note defines these boycotts as
political boycotts, for their goal is to coerce political expression.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never directly
decided what degree of protection to accord to political boycotts. In its
recent opinion in N4ACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,, however, the
Court confronted a political boycott that, unlike those described above,
had an unquestionably laudable goal: government support of racial
equality. The Claiborne Court suggested, in dictum, that the first
amendment protects political boycotts.2
This note argues that the Claiborne dictum is wrong and that the
first amendment should not protect participants in political boycotts. A
political boycott is a coercive mode of expression that, regardless of its
goals, deprives its victims of their freedom to speak and to associate as
they please. This note begins by examining the precedent for the
Claiborne decision. The note demonstrates that, in situations
analogous to a political boycott, courts have denied first amendment
protection to forms of conduct which coerce speech or association.3
The note then analyzes whether political boycotts merit protection as
expressive conduct under the test set out by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien,4 and concludes that under this test such
boycotts are not protected by the first amendment.5 In light of these
precedents the note then considers the Claiborne decision itself.6 It
1. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
2. Id at 915; see infra text accompanying notes 49-58.
3. See infra notes 7-38 and accompanying text.
4. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
5. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 49-86 and accompanying text.
1076
POLITICA4L BOYCOTTS
examines the Court's reasoning and suggests that future courts should
not follow Claiborne's approach toward political boycotts.
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF COERCIVE SPEECH: ANALOGIES
TO POLITICAL BOYCOTTS
A political boycott uses economic coercion to force its victims to
speak or act politically in a way that furthers the goals, not necessarily
of the speaker, but of the boycotter. Although the Supreme Court has
not explicitly ruled on the legality of political boycotts it has, in many
cases, indicated that the first amendment does not shield activity in-
tended to coerce individuals to express a particular view.
A. Regulation of Intrusive Expression.
The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment does not
absolutely protect a speaker's right to force others to listen to his
message. In Kovacs v. Cooper,7 for instance, the Court held that a mu-
nicipal ordinance banning the use of sound trucks did not violate the
first amendment.8 Justice Reed, writing for a divided Court,9 held that
the municipality had a compelling interest in protecting persons within
their homes from amplified messages. Justice Reed stated that the in-
trusive nature of this form of expression deprived the listener of his
choice of whether to receive the message and concluded that for the
Court "to enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others
would be harsh and arbitrary in itself."10 Using similar reasoning, the
Court, in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,I upheld a
federal statute that allowed individuals to remove themselves from
commercial mailing lists. The Court rejected the plaintiff mailer's
claim of a first amendment right to communicate, stating that "the right
of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the
right of others to communicate."' 2
Political boycotters intend to force others, by economic coercion,
to speak out in a certain way about a specific issue. If the first amend-
7. 336 U.S. 77 (1948).
8. Id at 87.
9. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton joined in Justice Reed's opinion. Justice Frank-
furter and Justice Jackson each wrote a separate concurrence.
10. 336 U.S. at 88.
11. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
12. Id at 736; see also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (Douglas, J.,
concurring)("While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen,
he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it."); Brush
v. Pennsylvania State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 249 Pa. Super. 164, 173, 375 A.2d 810, 815 (1977)(up-
holding regulation prohibiting door-to-door canvassing in dormitory).
1077Vol. 1983:1076]
DUKE LAW JOURMV4L
ment does not guarantee a right to force others to receive a message,
then surely it does not immunize political boycotts that seek to coerce
their victims, not just to listen, but to express a particular political view.
B. The Constitutionality of Governmentally-Compelled Disclosure of
Individuals' Political Belief&
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state's attempts to
force individuals to disclose their political beliefs violate the first and
fourteenth amendments. In NAA CP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson,13 the
first such "disclosure" case to reach the Court, the state of Alabama
had attempted to force an officer of the NAACP to disclose the organi-
zation's membership list. Noting that "on past occasions revelation of
the identity of [the NAACP's] rank-and-file members has exposed
these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility,' 4 the
Court held that
compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy
may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as
[governmental action which directly abridges that freedom]....
Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circum-
stances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.' 5
Similarly, in Shelton v. Tucker' 6 the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional a state law requiring public school teachers to disclose all or-
ganizations to which they had belonged in the past five years. The
Court stated that public disclosure of the information, "bringing with it
the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to discharge
teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would
simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitu-
tional liberty."'17
The Court in NAACP and Shelton thus held the states' actions
unconstitutional in part because it viewed the forced disclosure as
"'encouraging' private discrimination against those who espouse ideas
with a particular content."' 8 The fact that the state isprohibited by the
first and fourteenth amendments from facilitating private discrimina-
13. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
14. Id at 462.
15. Id; see also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 558
(1963)(state attempting to force disclosure of NAACP membership list).
16. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
17. Id at 486-87.




tion which, by punishing people for holding minority views, encour-
ages them to adopt different beliefs, suggests that the analogous private
activity designed to coerce political beliefs or expression is not constitu-
tionally protected. Political boycotts, which are directed at coercing
political expression, therefore should not be deemed constitutionally
privileged activity.
C. Protecting Employees from Employer-Coerced Political 4ctivity.
At least thirty-seven states have laws prohibiting private employ-
ers from preventing their employees from engaging in political activi-
ties or coercing their employees to do so.19 One court views such laws
as protecting "the fundamental right of employees to engage in polit-
ical activity without interference by employers. ' 20 The few courts that
have considered challenges to these laws have readily upheld their con-
stitutionality. InLockheedAircraft Corp. v. Superior Court,2' for exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court upheld a California statute
prohibiting employer coercion of political activities by its employees.22
The court found that the "right to ballot would be endangered if citi-
zens were deprived of any incidents of that right or if they were ham-
pered in their advocacy of or opposition to measures which may be
placed upon the ballot. ' 23 The court held that the statute is constitu-
tional because it neither expressly, nor implicitly deprives an employer
of his right to free speech.24
Because an employer, by virtue of his control over his employees'
job, is in a position to curtail his employees' freedom to engage in polit-
19. Carroll, Protecting Private Employees'Freedom ofPolitical Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
35, 58 (1981). These laws are collected in [2 State Laws] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 43,045 (1982). For
an example of a typical statute, see infra note 22.
20. Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 335, 392 P.2d 385, 387, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627
(1964); see also Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, 595 P.2d 592,
610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979).
21. 28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946).
22. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1971), which provides: "No employer shall make,
adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing employees from
engaging or participating in politics or from becoming candidates for public office. (b) Control-
ling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees."
See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971), which provides: "No employer shall coerce or
influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of dis-
charge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any partic-
ular course or line of political action or political activity."
23. 28 Cal. 2d at 486, 171 P.2d at 25.
24. Id; see also Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946) (upholding a
statute similar to the one considered in Lockheed). The Santiago court remarked that
an employee's right to adhere to the tenets of the political organization of his choice is a
basic right in any truly democratic society. To prevent discrimination by an employer
against an employee because that employee chooses to join a particular political party
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ical activity, the Lockheed court's holding is essential for protection of
the employees' political freedom. The court's reasoning is also readily
applied to the regulation of political boycotts; just as a merchant de-
pends on sales to customers for his livelihood, an employee makes his
living by selling labor to his employer. Thus there is the same potential
for coercion. Of course, an individual customer may have less eco-
nomic power over a merchant, and therefore less power to coerce him,
than a monopsonistic employer has over an employee. But when large
numbers of customers agree not to buy from a merchant, their eco-
nomic power to coerce that merchant equals an employer's economic
power over his employee. 25 Thus, when the specific goal of the boy-
cotting customers is to force the merchant to engage in or refrain from
political activity, the customers effectively deprive the merchant of his
political freedom. Because the first amendment does not protect an
employer who attempts to coerce his employees through economic
leverage to engage in political activity, it should not immunize the par-
ticipant in a political boycott who, through economic leverage, seeks to
coerce a merchant to engage in political activity.
D. Regulation of Coercive Labor Activity
Courts have consistently held that coercive labor activity is not
protected by the first amendment, regardless of its communicative as-
pects. Thus, for example, although most pickets are constitutionally
protected, pickets that block individuals from crossing the picket line,26
threaten violence,27 or attract large crowds28 can constitutionally be
serves to implement and enforce a right which is openly and proudly recognized and
vigilantly defended in a democracy.
Id The court held that, as applied to a job applicant who was not hired because of his political
activities, the statute does not greatly abridge the employer's freedom and "does not constitute a
violation of due process of law or of any clause of the. . .Federal Constitution." Id; see also
Spokane-Idaho Mining Co., 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 749, 752 (1947)(recognizing the importance of an
employee's freedom to engage in political activity).
25. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
26. See Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. See Milk Wagon Driver's Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 292
(1941); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1956).
28. See Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss.
1970); Rouse Philadelphia, Inc. v. Ad Hoc '78, 274 Pa. Super. 54, 64, 417 A.2d 1248, 1254 (1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
Additionally, some picketing creates what has been termed the "signal effect." As Justice
Douglas explained in Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942): "Picket-
ing by an organized group is more than free speech since it involves patrol of a particular locality
and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." .d at 776 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289
(1957). Although the signal effect is certainly less coercive than, for example, enforcing a boycott
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prohibited because they deprive others of the freedom to choose
whether or not to cross the picket line.2 9 The reasoning of these cases
suggests that because political boycotters seek to coerce rather than
merely to persuade their victims to speak and to associate they, too,
should not be deemed protected by the first amendment.
In a secondary labor boycott the labor union boycotts a neutral
employer (the secondary target) in order to increase pressure on the
primary target to accede to union demands. A major reason that courts
have found that secondary labor boycotts are not protected by the first
amendment is that such boycotts harm disinterested, neutral businesses
and coerce those businesses into pressuring the primary target.30
In Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 31 for instance, the
Supreme Court upheld the application of a Texas antitrust statute to
secondary labor picketing. The plaintiff, Ritter, had hired a contractor
to construct a building. The defendant union picketed Ritter's restau-
rant to protest the contractor's use of nonunion workers on the other
job. In the ensuing suit the Court recognized that picketing deserves
some constitutional protection. The Court held, however, that Texas
could constitutionally "confine the sphere of communication to that di-
rectly related to the dispute.' ' 32 To hold otherwise would have been to
"allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript
neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in
which it arose." 33
Using similar reasoning the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
against first amendment attacks section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
by the threat of violence, its effect-persons refusing to patronize a store regardless of the picket-
ers' message-is similar to the effect of the threat of violence, because it precludes a reasoned
response by those receiving the message.
For an in-depth look at the coercive aspects of labor picketing, see M. BROADWATER, LABOR
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. THORNHILL TO LOGAN VALLEY PLAZA 137-82 (1976).
29. McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 781, 108 S.E. 226, 229 (1921). The
evolution of the Supreme Court's approach to labor picketing is discussed in Note, Political Boy-
cottActivity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659, 663-71 (1978). See also M. BROAD-
WATER, supra note 28, at 137-82.
30. A primary boycott of the government can also occur. For example, when a group of
manufacturers agrees not to sell to the federal government unless it erects tariffs or enacts other
favorable legislation they engage in a primary political boycott. See, e.g., Michigan State Medical
Soe'y, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,991 (FTC Feb. 17, 1983) (physician boycott of Medicaid);
United States v. Montana Nursing Home Ass'n, 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,852 (D. Mont. 1982)
(boycott of Medicaid by nursing home association). Whether the first amendment protects pri-
mary boycotts of the government is beyond the scope of this note.
31. 315 U.S. 722 (1942). This was one of the first cases to consider the amount of protection
to be afforded to a secondary labor boycott.
32. Id at 727.
33. Id at 728.
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Relations Act,34 which prohibits secondary labor picketing and boy-
cotts. Most recently, in International Longshoremen's Association v. Al-
lied International, Inc.,3 5 the Court found that a longshoremen's
boycott of Soviet goods in protest of the Soviet Union's 1980 invasion
of Afghanistan violated section 8(b)(4) and was not protected by the
first amendment. The Court recognized that, although the union
claimed to be boycotting the Soviet Union, its members were actually
refusing to work for their American employers who imported Soviet
goods. The union was thus engaging in a secondary boycott: although
its grievance was with the Soviets, it was boycotting a third party. This
was not a typical secondary labor boycott, however, for its objectives
were not economic. Instead, the boycott arose out of both the long-
shoremen's moral repugnance to handling Soviet goods3 6 and their de-
sire to express disapproval of the Soviet Union's action.37 Thus, the
boycott, like a political boycott, sought to express a message concerning
a public issue in a way that injured others.38 Despite the boycott's ex-
pressive nature, the Court quickly dismissed the union's claim that its
actions were protected by the first amendment.3 9
The Court's decision in Allied confirms that both the federal gov-
ernment and the states can properly forbid secondary political boycotts,
at least within the labor setting, regardless of their communicative na-
ture. TheAllied Court's reasoning seems readily applicable to political
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); see, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S.
607, 616 (1980)(upholding section 8(b)(4) "[als applied to picketing that predictably encourages
consumers to boycott a secondary business"); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694, 705 (1950) (upholding section 8(b)(4)). Section 8(b)(4) states, in part, that it is an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a
refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person.
Labor Management Relations Act § 302(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976). This act provides for a
private cause of action for persons harmed by secondary labor pickets and boycotts that affect
commerce.
35. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
36. Id at 224.
37. Id at 214.
38. One should note that, although engaging in a boycott, the longshoremen were not seeking
to express or to coerce expression directed at a domestic government. Thus, unlike most political
boycotters, the longshoremen could make no claim to first amendment protection under the peti-
tion clause.
39. Allied, 456 U.S. at 227; see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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boycotts: like the secondary labor boycott, the political boycott is a
mode of expression that injures third parties. Additionally, political
boycotts are directed, not at forcing the victim to take economic action,
but at coercing his speech and association. Surely one seeking to co-
erce political activity should have no greater constitutional protection
than one who attempts to coerce economic activity.
Thus, in cases analogous to political boycotts the Supreme Court
has consistently held that the first amendment does not protect activity
designed to coerce speech or association. These cases should serve as
precedent when a court considers whether the first amendment protects
political boycotts. The cases suggest that because the political boycott
is a mode of communication which coerces speech and association
courts should not consider it a privileged means of expression.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE O'Brien TEST
A political boycott is not pure speech. Instead, it is expressive con-
duct. In United States v. O'Brien,4° the Supreme Court established a
four-part test to evaluate government prohibition of expressive con-
duct. Governmental regulation of expressive conduct should be
sustained
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 41
Government prohibition of political boycotts appears to survive
the O'Brien test. Both the federal and state governments have the con-
stitutional power required by the first part of the test to prohibit con-
duct like that found in those political boycotts that harms businesses
and coerces speech.42 In accord with the second part of the test, the
state governments have a strong interest in protecting innocent parties
from unprovoked and unjustified economic harm. More importantly,
both the federal government and state governments have quite a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the free speech and association of individ-
uals from economic coercion.43 Additionally, the representative system
of government is based in large part on the premise that the govern-
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Id at 377.
42. See, e.g., Allied, 456 U.S. at 222-27 (upholding prohibition of secondary labor boycott);
see also supra note 34.
43. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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ment should be responsive to the desires of the people. The govern-
ment therefore has a substantial interest in guaranteeing that it is
responding accurately to the political views the populace holds and not
to coerced expression.
None of these interests are related to the suppression of free ex-
pression. In prohibiting or providing recovery for damages caused by
secondary political boycotts the government is not seeking to ban cer-
tain ideas. It is attempting only to outlaw a mode of expression which
by its nature injures third parties regardless of the ideas it happens to
communicate. Thus, the third part of the test is satisfied. Finally, and
consistently with the fourth requirement, a law which prohibits polit-
ical boycotts does not sweep too broadly. The only way to protect boy-
cott victims is to prohibit political boycotts. Such a ban only
incidentally restricts speech; would-be boycotters may still express their
views through speeches, pamphleti, picketing, television commercials
or other means that seek to persuade third parties rather than to injure
or coerce them. Thus, a law which is construed to prohibit political
boycotts should survive the O'Brien test.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's application of the
O'Brien test in International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied Inter-
national, Inc.44 Although the Court did not explicitly state that section
8(b)(4) satisfied each portion of O'Brien, it implied that the statute sur-
vived the test. The Allied Court found that the governmental interest
underlying section 8(b)(4) includes the "protection of neutral employ-
ers and employees from the labor disputes of others. '45 In sustaining
the statute, the Court implicitly found that this interest is both substan-
tial46 and unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that the
federal government has the constitutional power to pass such a statute.
In asserting that "[tjhere are many ways in which a union and its indi-
vidual members may express their opposition to Russian foreign policy
without infringing upon the rights of others, ' 47 the Allied Court indi-
cated that the statute did not sweep too broadly and that it worked only
44. 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
45. 456 U.S. at 223 n.20 (citing NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951)). Section 8(b)(4) is also intended to preserve "the right of labor organizations to bring
pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes." Id.
46. Arguably, the fact that section 8(b)(4) is a labor law is enough to render the underlying
governmental interest substantial: the federal government has a strong interest in regulating the
conduct of labor unions. That section 8(b)(4) is a labor law, however, should not alone satisfy the
"substantiality" requirement of the O'Brien test. Congress could conceivably pass labor laws
which regulate the speech of labor unions although furthering only illusory interests. More im-
portantly, the central purpose of section 8(b)(4) is not merely to regulate labor unions; rather, it is
to protect neutral employers from economic coercion. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
47. 456 U.S. at 227.
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an incidental restriction on the longshoremen's freedom of speech.48
Like Section 8(b)(4), a law that prohibits political boycotts furthers the
governmental interest of protecting neutral parties. So long as such a
law is not overbroad, it, too, should survive the O'Brien test.
III. THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS POLITICAL BOYCOTTS:
NAACP v. CL.4iBoiiwE HARDWARE Co.
As the previous discussion demonstrates, there is precedent for up-
holding state or federal laws which restrict, and even prohibit, political
boycotts. In the first case in which the Supreme Court was confronted
with what protection to afford political boycotts, the Court ignored
these analogous cases. Instead, it indicated, in dicta, that the first
amendment does protect political boycotts.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ,49 the Court reviewed a
claim, under state tort law, by white merchants from Claiborne
County, Mississippi, for damages they suffered from a 1966 boycott of
their businesses. The NAACP had organized the boycott to put pres-
sure on the local town and county governments to accept its petition
demanding equal legal and economic treatment for blacks. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court recognized that because the boycott was intended
in part as an appeal for governmental action it was possibly entitled to
some measure of first amendment protection. That court reasoned,
however, that first amendment protection did not extend to violent con-
duct, and that because several of the boycotters had used violence and
threats of violence to force the black community to participate in the
48. See also Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553
(D. Del. 1980). In Osborn gasoline dealers agreed not to sell gasoline to consumers in order to
pressure the Department of Energy to raise the ceiling for their prices. Because the goal of this
boycott was to force a change in governmental policy, it was a political boycott. The court noted
that the Sherman and Clayton Acts were intended to further the "strong" governmental interest in
regulating anticompetitive activity, id at 558, and "purport on their face to regulate such conduct
in a manner that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id Thus the first amend-
ment did not, under O'Brien, forbid their application to the defendants. Furthermore, because
"the effect of the application of those laws would be content neutral, would not materially inhibit
effective expression, and would alleviate the coercive economic impact of a concerted refusal to
deal," they could constitutionally be applied to conduct such as defendant's. Id at 557. But see
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.) (considering the same
facts and concluding that defendants were protected from Sherman Act liability by the first
amendment), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
For further discussion of O'Brien in the boycott context, see Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the
Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommodation of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 983, 1010-13 (1982); Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131,
1144-48 (1980).
49. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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boycott, the boycott was not privileged.50 The United States Supreme
Court agreed that "violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional
protection"5' and held that the defendants who had used violence
could be held responsible for resulting damages.52 The Court, how-
ever, reversed the state court's holding that the boycott's violence was
sufficiently widespread to justify overriding the boycotters' first amend-
ment claims and imposing liability for all damages flowing from the
boycott on all of the participants. Such a holding, the Court found, was
simply not precise enough as to the basis of each defendant's liability to
satisfy the requirements of the first amendment.5 3
The Claiborne Court then stated that "the nonviolent elements of
[the boycotters'] activities are entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. '54 In light of the narrow and seemingly uncontroversial
rationale for reversing the Mississippi Supreme Court, Claiborne's dis-
cussion of whether the nonviolent aspects of the boycott were protected
by the first amendment seems to be dictum. Nevertheless, because of its
sweeping assertions with regard to political boycotts, Claiborne could
easily come to stand for the proposition that all peaceful boycotts di-
rected at obtaining governmental action are protected by the first
amendment. 55
A. Claiborne's Rationale. Peaceful Poi'tical Activity is Privileged
Although Claiborne recognized the primary, rather than secon-
dary, aspects56 of the protest, it did not focus on their constitutional
significance. Instead, the Court indicated that the peaceful aspects of
the boycott were privileged because "a major purpose of the boycott
• ..was to influence governmental action. ' 57 The Court also focused
50. Id at 894-96.
51. Id at 933.
52. Id at 926.
53. Id at 918-20.
54. Id at 915.
55. See supra notes 7-38 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57. 458 U.S. at 914. The Court noted that defendants' petition to the town and county gov-
ernments was amended to include a demand that all stores "employ Negro clerks and cashiers."
Id at 899-900. The boycott, although secondary in that it demanded that its victims join the
boycotters in pressuring the government, was primary with regard to those demands made on the
merchants relating to the operation of their businesses.
Although it appears that no cases have so held, most courts have indicated that peaceful
primary noncommercial boycotts are protected by the first amendment. See Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (197 l)("The claim that the expressions were intended to
exercise a coercive impact on respondent [the victim of pamphleting] does not remove them from
the reach of the First Amendment."); Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982); see also
Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 134 n.46 (1982).
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on the organizational efforts of the defendants, efforts which included
speeches and picketing. In reference to these "speech" aspects of the
boycott, the Court held that the state had no "right to prohibit peaceful
political activity such as that found in the boycott in this case."' 58 In
other words, the Court focused on the speeches taking place within the
boycott in order to protect the entire boycott. The plaintiffs in Clai-
borne did not, however, seek to impose liability solely on the basis of
defendants' speech as "speech." Rather, the plaintiffs had alleged that
they were damaged by defendants' conduct-the boycott-as well as by
defendants' speech in furtherance of that conduct.59
Although the government cannot constitutionally prohibit political
speech as such, the presence of political activity does not always immu-
nize a course of conduct. Political speech otherwise constitutionally
protected is not privileged when used in furtherance of an illegal objec-
The boycotters in Claiborne, because of the peculiar mixed nature of their boycott, could have
asserted two separate first amendment defenses. Thus, even if the Supreme Court had held that
the secondary-political aspects of the boycott did not provide immunity under the first amend-
ment, the defense that the boycott was primary and noncommercial might well have succeeded.
The Claiborne Court also observed that "[m]any of the owners of these boycotted stores were
civic leaders in Port Gibson and Claiborne County," 458 U.S. at 889 n.3; see also id at 892 n.8,
suggesting that the boycott in Claiborne was in part a primary boycott of "civic leaders" or public
officials to protest policies for which they were responsible. A primary governmental boycott is,
however, a direct boycott of the government and not, as was the case here, a boycott of the private
businesses of government officials. Moreover, it is unlikely that the first amendment protects at-
tempts to influence governmental activity by coercive activity directed at governmental leaders in
theirprivate capacity. See supra note 30.
58. 458 U.S. at 913 (emphasis added).
59. This claim distinguishes Claiborne from the Noerr line of cases. See Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), citedin Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
913. These cases stand for the proposition that joint efforts by members of an industry to persuade
the government to act in order to help that industry are not subject to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982), and may be protected by the first amendment as petitions of the government. See
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-44; Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978);
California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509-11 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-71 (1965). The defendants in these cases petitioned the
government through pure speech; they did not seek to organize boycotts of private parties. See
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142 ("There are no specific findings that the [defendants] attempted directly to
persuade anyone not to deal with the [plaintiffs]."). Thus, plaintiffs were damaged by the message
defendants were trying to express to the government. Prohibiting the speech because of its content
therefore may well have violated the first amendment, as it "would have involved government
control of the marketplace of ideas." Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers, 499
F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. Del. 1980); see also Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal.
1972)(the first amendment protects individuals who, by the content of their speech, induced the
government to breach a contract with the plaintiff). The political boycott, in contrast to Noerr-
type speech, is composed of expressive conduct that damages individuals regardless of the message
a particular boycott is intended to convey. Thus, because governmental prohibition of political
boycotts is directed at the harmful means of conduct rather than at the expression of a particular
idea, Noerr is not dispositive. See Osborn, 449 F. Supp. at 557; Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682,
688-89 (Utah 1982).
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tive.60 Just as individuals are not immune from criminal liability be-
cause they use political speech to encourage or to organize riots or
murders in the name of a political goal, boycott organizers who couple
political speech with an otherwise illegal boycott6' are not necessarily
immune from liability resulting from that boycott. Thus, the Claiborne
defendants' claim of first amendment privilege should have been sus-
tained only f the boycott itself could not constitutionally be prohibited.
B. Claiborne' Misapplication of the O'Brien Test.
Because the boycott in Claiborne was expressive conduct,62 the
Claiborne Court used the O'Brien test to determine the constitutional-
ity of the Mississippi law prohibiting the boycott. In applying the
O'Brien test, the Court cited 63 Missouri v. National Organization for
Women, Inc. ,64 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered whether the National Organization for Wo-
men (NOW) was liable under the Sherman Act and state tort law65 for
organizing a political boycott. NOW's convention boycott of Missouri
hotels had the sole purpose of forcing those hotels to pressure the Mis-
souri state legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.6 6 The
60. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). The Giboney Court
stated that
it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language. . . . Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional
guarantees of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws
aga st agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other. . . conspiracies deemed
injurious to society.
Id at 502 (citations omitted); see also National Soey of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 697 (1978)("While the resulting order may curtail the exercise of liberties that the Soci-
ety might otherwise enjoy, that is a necessary and, in cases such as this, unavoidable consequence
of the violation. ... ); Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131,
1161-63 (1980). But see Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 659, 679-83 (1978)(arguing that a prohibition of efforts to encourage third parties not to deal
with a business is unconstitutional content regulation).
61. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that as a matter of state law the boycott was illegal.
See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 894-95. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether this
otherwise illegal boycott was protected by the first amendment. Id at 906-07.
62. Id at 911.
63. Id at 914 n.48.
64. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
65. The common law tort inNOWwas "intentional infliction of harm without legal excuse,"
a tort which the court stated allows recovery against one who has "intentionally interfere[d] with a
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another." 620 F.2d at 1316. This tort is thus
virtually identical to the one considered in Claiborne. In fact, both torts have been lumped to-
gether with other similar torts under the heading of "interference with prospective advantage."
See Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious Interference, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 341,
342-44 (1974).
66. 620 F.2d at 1302-03.
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NOW court held that NOW was protected from common law tort lia-
bility by the first amendment's petition clause. Applying the O'Brien
test, the NOW court held that "the right to petition is of such impor-
tance that it is not an improper interference [under state tort law] even
when exercised by way of a boycott. '67 Thus, the court balanced the
boycotters' interest in free speech with the state's interest in prohibiting
the boycott 68 and found that the boycotters' interest outweighed the
state's interest. Undertaking a similar balancing, Claiborne held that
"the right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a
complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically-motivated boy-
cott designed to force governmental and economic change .... 69
Unlike many constitutional tests, however, the O'Brien test is not
one which balances interests. The O'Brien test requires instead that a
law manifest four separate qualities to survive a first amendment at-
tack.70 Thus, Claiborne, like NOW, misapplied the O'Brien test to the
state law being challenged. Had the Court retained a nonbalancing
approach, it probably would have concluded that the law challenged in
Claiborne survived the O'Brien test.71
C. Claiborne's Failure to Distinguish Allied.
Recognizing Claiborne's apparent inconsistency with Allied,72 the
Claiborne Court indirectly attempted to reconcile the two cases. First,
the Claiborne Court tried to limit its holding by distinguishing in a
footnote between a claim brought in tort, as in Claiborne, and one
brought under a statute, such as the claim in Allied: "We need not
decide in this case the extent to which a narrowly tailored statute
designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or certain
types of secondary pressure may restrict protected First Amendment
activity."' 73 The distinction fails to resolve the inconsistency, however.
The most likely inference to be drawn from the Court's statement is
that the common law tort it considered in Claiborne was overbroad.74
67. Id at 1317. This language was quoted with approval in Claiborne. 458 U.S. at 914 n.48.
68. Seealso Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 769 (M.D. Pa.)(the
boycotters' "interest in free expression ... outweighs the interest in free trade and unrestrained
competition [embodied in the Sherman Act]"), rev'don other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
69. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 914.
70. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
72. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see supra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
73. 458 U.S. at 915 n.49.
74. For cases involving overbreadth, see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288
(1964). See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
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This reading is not borne out by the Claiborne opinion, however, for it
simply did not use overbreadth as a rationale.75 The Court held, not
that the tort was overbroad, but that the boycotters' nonviolent "activi-
ties are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment." 76 In both
Allied and Claiborne, however, the defendants engaged in the same ac-
tivity: a boycott intended as expressive political conduct. Both the
statute in Allied and the tort law in Claiborne were construed to pro-
hibit that conduct. Thus, Claiborne's distinction between a common
law cause of action and a narrowly drawn statutory cause of action
seems unsatisfactory.
Claiborne also sought to distinguish A/lied on the basis of the na-
ture of the activity being regulated. In Claiborne the Court cited Allied
as an example of a case in which the "Court has recognized the strong
governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even
though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of free
speech and association. '77 Claiborne then held that "[w]hile States
have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do not find a com-
parable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that found in
the boycott in this case."78 This distinction between economic activity
in Allied and political activity in Claiborne is specious, however. In
fact, the Court itself undercut this distinction by explicitly recognizing
in Allied that the longshoremen's boycott had a "political objective" 79
and by noting that the "distinction between labor and political objec-
tives would be difficult to draw in many cases." 80 As the predominant
purpose of the boycotts in both Allied and Claiborne was expression,
the cases are fundamentally indistinguishable.
Dean Harry Wellington has noted that one explanation for Clai-
borne's inconsistency with Allied is that the Court based its decisions
on the speaker's identity: "[Liabor unions ordinarily are organizations
dedicated to economic activity and. . . economic activity is subject to
substantial governmental regulation," whereas the "NAACP is often
a political action organization and political action is rightly subject
75. Furthermore, the fact that the overbreadth doctrine has been losing favor as a means of
constitutional adjudication contributes to the conclusion that Claiborne was not decided on the
basis of overbreadth. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756-57 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 159-62 (1974); Broadrich v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-18 (1973). But see Oregon
v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569, 589-90 (1982)(statute prohibiting "coercion" overbroad).
76. 458 U.S. at 915 (emphasis added).
77. Id at 912.
78. Id at 913.




to substantial government protection ."81 The Supreme Court in fact
distinguished the two cases, not only by the identity of the speaker, but
also, it seems, by the views the speaker expressed. In Allied the Court
did not seem to find the union's message particularly compelling and
focused principally on the secondary boycott as a means of expressive
conduct.8 2 In contrast, the Court in Claiborne not only noted the gen-
eral political activity of the boycotters, but expressed its sympathy with
the content of the boycotters' message. The Court remarked that the
boycotters "sought to bring about political, social, and economic
change. Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather than through
riot or revolution-petitioners sought to change a social order that had
consistently treated them as second-class citizens. ' 83 The Court further
stated that the boycotters
sought to vindicate rights of equality and of freedom that lie at the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The right of the States to
regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition
against a nonviolent, politically-motivated boycott designed to force
governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution itself.84
Although the government can constitutionally regulate certain
forms of expressive conduct,85 it may not generally determine who may
speak or what may be said. Regulation of expression must usually be
neutral with regard to both speaker and content.8 6 Claiborne violated
this principle by basing its holding that the defendants were protected
by the first amendment on both the identity of the speaker and the
81. H. Wellington, Remarks at Yale Law School Alumni Weekend (Oct. 23, 1982)(copy on
file with author).
82. 456 U.S. 212, 223 (1981).
83. 458 U.S. at 912.
84. Id at 914.
85. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("We cannot accept the view that an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
86. There are certain and well known exceptions to the rule that regulation of speech may not
be content-related. Thus, a state may prohibit "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and regulate pornography, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973),
and defamation, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). But the type of speech
found in Claiborne andfilled-speech concerning public issues or political speech-is not an area
of expression which the government can regulate according to content. See, eg., Police Dep't. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)(noting the "usual rule that governmental bodies may
not prescribe the form or content of individual expression"); see also Stone, Restrictions on Speech




content of the message expressed, rather than on an objective analysis
of the political boycott as a form of expression.
Although Claiborne reached the appealing result of protecting an
appeal for racial equality, it did so by using faulty first amendment
analysis. Claiborne should simply have held that the violence sur-
rounding the boycott was not sufficient to remove any first amendment
protection. The Supreme Court should have resisted the temptation to
state that the peaceful organizing activities and the boycott itself were
privileged as political activity, for in so doing the Court has created the
danger that Claiborne will come to stand for the proposition that the
first amendment protects all political boycotts, regardless of the nature
of their goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like parades, pamphleting, and picketing, political boycotts can
be used by any speaker to express a desire for governmental action.
The political boycott is thus only one of a number of modes of expres-
sion. Although federal and state governments cannot, in general, con-
stitutionally ban the expression of particular views or ideas, 87 they can
regulate or prohibit harmful means of expressing those views, without
offending the first amendment.
Because a political boycott deprives its victims of their own free-
dom of speech and association, it should not be considered a protected
means of speech. The immediate goal of a political boycott is to force
its victims, private parties, to express themselves politically. The coer-
cive power of a political boycott should not be underestimated.
Merchants depend on sales for their livelihood; an effective boycott of
their stores deprives them of their source of income.88 Although at-
tempts to persuade individuals to act are usually protected by the first
amendment, attempts to coerce individuals to act are not so immu-
nized.89 As the Supreme Court has noted, the "right of free speech of
87. See supra text accompanying note 86.
88. Twelve of the plaintiff merchants in Claiborne suffered a combined loss of $944,699 as a
result of the mixed primary and secondary political boycott at issue in that case. 458 U.S. at 893.
89. That political boycotts deprive their victims of first amendment-like rights is demon-
strated by cases in which labor unions acting under color of state law have attempted to coerce
speech and association by private individuals. In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
234-37 (1977), the Court recognized the right to refrain from association and held that nonmem-
bers of a labor union, who are required by federal law to remit a service fee to the union for its
bargaining services, have a constitutional right to forbid the union from using those fees for polit-
ical purposes. Similarly, Justice Douglas stated in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 777 (1979)(Douglas J., concurring), that "[s]ince neither Congress nor the state legisla-
tures can abridge [First Amendment] rights, they cannot grant the power to private groups to
abridge them."
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• . . [an] individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free
speech of others."90
Claiborne's dictum that a peaceful political boycott is privileged
should be given no precedential value because the Supreme Court
failed to consider the first amendment question fully and objectively.
Modes of expression which coerce speech or association are not privi-
leged, for they deprive individuals of their first amendment freedom to
refrain from speech and association. The victims of political boycotts
are financially coerced to express themselves politically, regardless of
whether they hold the views they are forced to express, whether they
desire to make their own views known, or whether they wish to associ-
ate with the boycotters. Because of these harmful side effects, courts
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in Kolinski v. UAW, 530 F. Supp. 728
(D.D.C. 1982), recently extended Abood, holding that "a union may not require a non-member,
as a condition of receiving strike benefits, to march in a picket line... when he would not choose
to do so voluntarily and did not take part in the union's decision to strike and picket." Id at 733.
The Koinski court held that it also was an unconstitutional infringement on the nonmembers'
freedoms of speech and association, as well as a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)(which guaran-
tees employees the right to organize and to refrain from organizing), to condition a nonmember's
receipt of strike benefits on some alternative form of service, such as working in a strike kitchen;
the nonmember had already paid for the benefits in the service fee and the "sole and ultimate
utility [of the alternative service] is the advancement of the union's message." 530 F. Supp. at 733.
The court distinguished this situation -from conditioning a member's receipt of benefits on his
involvement in strike activities: "by exercising his choice to become a member. . . and partici-
pating in its decision-making process, a member of a union accepts as his own, to the extent that
he is a part of that group, the position of the union on the question of whether to strike." Id at
733.
Courts have also protected union members from union efforts to control their individual
political activities. The court in Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d
796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1961), for instance, held that a union unconstitutionally deprived a mem-
ber of his first amendment rights when it penalized him for engaging in political activity that the
union opposed. Thus, although a union may require its members to strike, NLRB v. Allis-Chal-
mers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967)(a union can fine members who do not honor authorized
strikes), it cannot constitutionally control its members' individual political expression. The union
in Dudek v. Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, 426 Pa. 233, 228 A.2d 752 (1967), went one step further. it
required its members to engage in political activity, the picketing of a political candidate. The
court noted that "the Union in this case ... argues that to require members to exercise public
speech through picketing is not to deny freedom of speech but to implement it. However, the
[union] fails to realize that the right to speak carries with it its inevitable counterpart, the right not
to speak." 425 Pa. at 239, 228 A.2d at 755.
90. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). In Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d
682 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court of Utah adopted this reasoning in holding that political
boycotts are not protected by the first amendment. The court remarked that "when injury is
caused to a disinterested party, not by the subject matter of the expressions themselves, but by the
means used to achieve such expressions, the First Amendment confers no absolute privilege." Id
at 689. The court therefore held that the defendants' claim of first amendment protection would
fail if defendants "specifically intended to injure [plaintiffs'] businesses in order to coerce them to
join in defendants' petitioning efforts." Id
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should not afford political boycotts protection under the first amend-
ment.
Gordon M. Orloff
